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ABSTRACT

.The purpose of this study is to assess the influence of indi
vidual differences in information utilization on the interpersonal
evaluation process, and to examine the effects of stress on the eva
luator as he forms his judgment.
An experimental task was devised in which two groups of sub
jects, one high and one low in cognitive complexity, viewed bogus
videotapes of one person in interaction with another.

After view

ing the tapes, subjects in both groups were exposed to one of three
stress conditions: neutral or no stress; irrelevant stress, in which
the stress is induced as part of another experiment; and relevant stress,
in which the stress arises from the task itself.

Each subject then

recorded his evaluation of the target person.
The results indicated that subjects high in cognitive complexity
wrote more complex evaluations than subjects low in cognitive com
plexity; subjects not exposed to stress wrote more complex evaluations
than subjects operating in a stressful environment.
It is suggested that these differences are a function of the
individual’s ability to utilize information, based on the number of
dimensions he has available for this utilization.

The results suggest

that stress, either by reducing the number of dimensions available
or by weakening the links between dimensions, reduces the individual’s
ability to process the information.
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INTERPERSONAL EVALUATION

COGNITIVE ASPECTS AND THE EFFECTS OF STRESS

Research on the processes and principles of interpersonal evaluation, or person perception, has in recent years been conducted
using two quite disparate approaches, each emphasizing a particular
mode of study and a particular theoretical context.

One body of re

search, stimulated primarily by the work of Heider(1958) and given
further impetus by the findings of Jones and his associates(Jones,
Davis and Gergen, 1961; Jones, Jones and Gergen, 1963; Jones and Da
vis, 1-965) focuses on the perceiver as one whose primary tasks are
attribution and inference.

The former process, as defined by Kelley

(1967) in his summary of theoretical principles of attribution, is
one of inferring or perceiving the dispositional properties of enti
ties in the environment.

That is, the perceiver seeks to find suf

ficient reason why the target person acts in a certain way.

Hence,

according to these researchers, the perceiver infers the stable dis
positions or attributes of the target person from the latter1s actions.
In addition, the evaluator or perceiver decides whether to
attribute an action by the individual to that individual’s intentions
or to chance factors.

The target person will be evaluated different

ly if the effect of an action is perceived as intended by him than
if the effect is seen as accidental or unintentional.

Our judicial

system provides an illustrative example; a man who kills for revenge
(i.e., he intended to kill) is judged more harshly than one who kills
accidentally.
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The attributive models of interpersonal evaluation, then,
view the perceiver as a decision-maker, one who weighs the informa
tion received about the target person in accordance with what he has
inferred about the individual from past contact(i.e., does this trait
really belong to him?).

A second line of research on person percep

tion is concerned not with whether the perceiver actually ascribes a
trait to the target person, but the manner in which the ascribed
traits are joined.

Mathematical theories of person perception accept

the validity of all the traits of the target person presented to the
perceiver, and are more concerned with determining the rules govern
ing the combination of these traits to produce an overall impression.
One group of researchers, for example, favors an averaging
type formulation, in which great attention is paid to the balancing
of extreme traits by moderate traits(Anderson, 1959, 1965; Levy and
Richter, 1963; Rimoldi, 1956; Weiss, 1963).

Another group of inves

tigators favors a summation model which holds that each new piece of
information received about a target person by the perceiver serves
to increase his attitude toward or evaluation of that person(Abelson,
1961; Gulliksen, 1956).

In recent years, the addition of factor

analysis as a technique for analyzing trait relationships has led to
studies of such relationships in terms of constant error(Levy and Du
gan, 1960), and the widespread use of multidimensional scaling techniques
(Rosenberg et al, 1968).

One of the most recent models developed,

which analyzes an evaluation as a complex stimulus whose compound is
the weighted average of its constituents, where the weighting associ-
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ated with each element is directly related to its extremity(Manis
et al, 1968), reflects a more sophisticated use of mathematics in
its highly complex approach to the evaluation process.
Ultimately, any theory of interpersonal evaluation must con
cern itself with the cognitive processes by which bits of information
about the target person are selected and eventually organized into
a unified evaluation or opinion.

While such processes have not been

the nexus of interest for either of the two models discussed, both
have attempted to indicate, at least indirectly, the nature of infor
mation utilization.

Attribution models, for example, suggest what

may be loosely termed an "input filter”, with the individual accepting
or rejecting various traits, depending on past information accepted
as valid.

Similarly, mathematical models, operating on the assumption

that all traits have been accepted as valid by the perceiver, focus on
combinatory rules.
It is surprising, therefore, that interpersonal evaluation
theories in which cognitive processes play a substantial role have
by and large neglected the inclusion of individual differences in the
operation of such processes as factors relevant to that evaluation.
Evaluation theories have consistently assumed that the unique cogni
tive, as well as motivational, characteristics of the perceiver are
irrelevant to the manner in which he evaluates another individual.
Perhaps, then, additional light may be shed on the evaluation process
by examining it within the context of individual differences in the
utilization of information.

In other words, in what ways in informa-
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tion about another person received, selectively processed and weight
ed by the perceiver in the same manner as any other type of informa
tion?
In this respect, the research of personality theorists on cog
nitive styles may prove illuminating.

Cognitive styles refer to re

latively fixed patterns for experiencing the world, mechanisms by which
information about the environment is selected, organized and combined.
Of these, the cognitive style which has been most concerned with in
dividual differences in the ability of the individual to differentiate
the behavior of others has been cognitive complexity-simplicity-.
In their formulation of the cognitive complexity-simplicity
variable, Schroder and his associates (Schroder, Driver and Streufert,
1965) view it as a construct dealing with the nature and interdepen
dence of rules avilable for organizing dimensional values.

Like

Bruner(1957, 1961), Schroder employs the concept of "categories"
or "dimensions"; each bit of information, whether about an event,
object or person, is placed in one of the categories.

In the case of

information about a person, the ultimate combination of elements

in

other words, the resulting evaluation— -depends on how many ways the
categories or dimensions are combined to produce a variety of aspects
which the perceiver ascribes to the target person.

This in turn is a

function of the level of cognitive complexity possessed by the perceiver
and environmental factors present while the information is being com
bined.

Persons with a high level of conceptual or cognitive complex

ity not only have more dimensions available to them, but are also able
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to combine the dimensions in more ways than individuals with a low
level of cognitive complexity, who, Schroder notes, should tend to
view information in terms of black and white with few shades of grey
in between.
Schroder has used this formulation to predict differential
utilization of non-social information, employing tasks in which the
complexity of the information as well as level of cognitive complexi
ty is varied.

In one representative study, Streufert et al(1965),

using the Inter-Nation Simulation Game(INS) as a testing instrument,
examined the influence of cognitive complexity on decision-making,
with the amount of information successively increased over a number
of trials.

Results indicated that subjects high in cognitive complex-

ity are able to use more information and are therefore likely to make
more adequate decisions.

Other studies have examined the effects of

this variable on conflict resolution (Schroder and Crano, 1965), per
ceptual processes(Schroder, Streufert and Allen, 1962) and compon
ent assessment (Schroder, Harvey, Hunt and Koslin, 1965).
A second line of research on cognitive complexity has linked
it to a number of variables dealing with the social interaction pro
cess and to other personality variables.

Bieri(1965), for example,

has demonstrated that individuals high in cognitive complexity seem
able to make more correct predictions about another’s behavior, when
given the same amount of information about that person as individuals
low in cognitive complexity.

Individuals high in cognitive complexity

have also displayed a greater ability to deal with inconsistent infor-

mation(Mayo and Crockett, 1964; Leventhal and Singer, 1964), and,
in general, seem slightly less extraverted(Bieri, 1957) and less sus
ceptible to social desirability influences(Bieri, 1965).
The implications of this body of theory and research dealing
with cognitive complexity for the study of the evaluation process
seem clear.

Two relevant factors emerge which form the basis for two

hypotheses.

First, it has been found that persons with a high level

of cognitive complexity are able to combine categories in more ways;
in terms of person perception, this should mean that they should pro
duce more complex evaluations than individuals low in cognitive com
plexity.

The latter, no matter how many traits are inferred or com

bined, should still evaluate the target person in terms of a few di
mensions, primarily a "good-bad" dimension.
The second conclusion which can be drawn is that environmental
factors(particularly stress) may influence the kind of evaluation
which an individual produces.

Schroder(1965) notes two fundamental

properties of the environment which may influence utilization of infor
mation, environmental complexity and environmental stress or arousal
level, and theorizes that as arousal level becomes too high, cog
nitive activity becomes more concrete,i.e., complexity level is re
duced.

It is therefore hypothesized that individuals operating un

der stress will produce less complex evaluations than individuals in
a less threatening environment.
The term "stressful environment", unfortunately,.is a general
term which fails to indicate that stress may be introduced in the ex-
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perimental environment by a variety of techniques which may have dif
ferent implications for the subject's behavior.

In the case of a sub

ject asked to perform an experimental task, a stressful environment
may be produced in two ways.

It may emanate from the task itself(the

demands of the task, for example), or it may be introduced without being di
rectly linked to the performance of the task.

An interesting ques

tion is whether stress will have a differential effect on the complexity
of the perceiver's evaluation, depending upon which of these two ways
it is induced in the subject.

To investigate this possibility, two

stress conditions, task-relevant and task-irrelevant stress, were in
cluded in the

design.

Method

Subjects.

48 male college undergraduates, enrolled in an

introductory psychology course, served as subjects.

Participation

was voluntary, and all subjects were paid $3.20 for their time.
Stimulus Materials.

To provide a task adequately reflecting

differences in utilization of information in evaluating another per
son, two videotapes were employed.

Two accomplices, experienced in

acting, were asked to produce different kinds of behavior while in in
teraction with each other.
conversation.

One served as the "neutral" party in the

The other was, in one segment, mildly friendly; in

another, mildly hostile.

About four hours of conversation were video

taped, and two 5-minute segments, representing the two kinds of behavior,
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were eventually selected as experimental items. „ To insure that
the segments were both realistic and displayed approximately equal amounts of friendliness and hostility, the segments were screened by
10 independent judges who were not informed of the experiment's
purpose.

Five of the judges viewed the "friendly" tape; the remain

ing five viewed the hostile tape.

The semantic differential(Os

good, Suci and Tannebaum, 1957) was employed to assess the judges'
reaction to the target person.

With 1 representing a very favorable judg

ment and 7 a very unfavorable judgment, the average rating was 2.50
for the "friendly" person and 5.2 for the "hostile" person; thus, the
two kinds of behavior were equally polarized.

A t-test, using

deviations from the neutral point as scores, revealed no significant
difference(t^ = .18, df = 8, NS)

with respect to distance from neutrali

ty.
Stress was manipulated by the use of electrical equipment,
consisting of two control panels with a complex series of lights and
dials mounted on a heavy frame.

The words "Electric Shock Generator"

were printed in large letters on one control panel, and electrodes
were connected to the machine.

To enhance the effectiveness of the

equipment in inducing stress, electrode paste and an elastic band for
securing the electrodes to the S>s were placed on the table in the ex
perimental room next to the equipment.

The ability of the equipment to

induce stress was also pretested, using 6 j[s, again unconnected
with the experiment in any other way.

Half of these Ss were shown the
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film segments and taken to the room containing the equipment; the
others were taken to a similar room containing no equipment,

_Ss in

the former condition reported significantly more symptoms of stress on
a questionnaire(_t = 4.74, df = 4,2.
condition.

*01) thaii Ss in the latter

Galvanic Skin Response(GSR) measures taken during this

pretesting session confirmed the efficacy of the machine in inducing
stress.
Procedure.

All Ss were given a test of cognitive complexity

(Bieri, 1955) several weeks prior to the experiment.

A cognitive com

plexity score was derived for each S>. and the set of scores split at
the median.

Ss scoring above the median comprised the high cognitive

complexity (HC) group; Ss whose scores fell below the median were
placed in the low cognitive complexity(LC) group.

To minimize

the effects of experimenter bias, Ss were then scheduled for experi
mental sessions by an assistant who was uninformed about the true
nature of the experiment.

_E thus had no way of knowing the complexity

level of the Ss during these sessions.
On entering the experimental room, each S^ was given a set of
instructions to read before proceeding:
In recent years, psychologists have become increas
ingly interested in how impressions of other people
are formed and how evaluative judgments are made about
them. Specifically, researchers have been concerned with
the manner in which stable opinions are formed about an
individual and persist even when that individual’s be
havior is different in different situations.
In the first part of the experiment, you will see
two pieces of film. Over the past semester, I have been
bringing subjects into this room in pairs, telling them
that my experiment dealt with impression formation, and
asking them to talk with each other for awhile. Supposedly,,
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they would then fill out rating scales of each other.
In.reality, their conversation was videotaped from be
hind a one way mirror. These two pieces of film are
part of a conversation between two of these people.
Please look at them carefully. Any questions?
Each

then viewed the two film segments.

For the entire

group of S s ; t h e order of presentation was counterbalanced, so that
half the S_s saw the "friendly" tape first and half viewed the "Hos
tile" tape first.

After seeing the tapes, the Ss were led to one of

two randomly assigned rooms.

Ss in the neutral or no-stress(NS) con

dition were taken to a room containing no electrical equipment and
merely asked to spend five minutes recording their evaluation of the
target person after seeing "two different sides of his personality."
Ss in the two stress conditions were taken to the room containing the
electrical equipment, and were given slightly different instruc
tions, depending on the stress condition to which they had been
assigned.

j>s in the task-irrelevant stress condition(IS) were told

that they had actually signed up for two experiments, and that after
they had finished the evaluation, they would participate in another
brief, unrelated experiment involving the use of the electrical equip
ment.

Ss in the task-relevant stress condition(RS) were told that

there would be another part to the experiment after they finished their
evaluations, involving the use of the equipment.

They were also

told that this second part would require them to employ the infor
mation they had gained about the target person.

Hence the implied

threat of shock was in this condition directly linked to the informa
tion.
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After the _Ss had completed the evaluations, JE conducted
interviews to ascertain the effectiveness of the manipulations.

All

of the Ss were apparently unaware of the deceptions involved, and on
ly one

voiced any suspicions about the E_'s veracity.

Ss were then

fully debriefed concerning the nature of the experiment, and the
necessity of using the threat of shock as an experimental device was
explained.

E_ then answered any questions the Ss had until the Ss

seemed satisfied with the explanations given.

Each ^ was then paid

$3.20 and sworn to secrecy about the experiment before leaving.

Results and Discussion

An analysis of the data was conducted for 42 of the original
48 Ss.

Three Ss were eliminated because they personally knew the

target person, three J3s repeatedly failed to appear for their exper—
mental sessions, and one

was eliminated because of suspicion about

the stress manipulation.
For each S^, two separate scores were tabulated; the number
of constructs used (the dependent variable in the study) and the to
tal number of words employed in writing the evaluation.

Each set of

scores was then separately analyzed in a 2 (level of cognitive complex
ity) x 3 (stress) analysis of variance.
Table 1 lists the mean number of constructs used by S!s in
each condition.

The largest number of constructs was used by Ss

high in cognitive complexity operating in a non-threatening environ-

TABLE 1

MEAN NUMBER OF CONSTRUCTS USED BY COMPLE
XITY LEVEL AND STRESS CONDITION

NS

RS

IS

High complexity

8.00

5.71

5.28

Low Complexity

4.28

3.71

3.14
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TABLE 2
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR CONSTRUCT SCORES

Source of Variance

df

Mean Square

F

Complexity

1

72.02

36.74*

Stress

2

14.02

7715*

Interaction

2

3.16

36

1.96

Within Groups

1.61
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ment; in general, Ss high in cognitive complexity used more constructs
than Ss in the LC condition.

Similarly, Ss in the neutral condition

tended to use more constructs than Ss subjected to stress.

An analysis

of variance for these scores, given in Table 2, reveals both of these
differences to be significant.

j3s in the HC condition wrote signifi

cantly (F = 36.74, d_f = 1/36, j) <• .001) more complex evaluations
than Ss in the LC condition; j3s writing their evaluations in a non
threatening environment wrote significantly (F = 7.15,df = 2 / 3 6 , . 0 0 1 )
more complex evaluations than Ss subjected to stress.

No significant

interaction effects were observed.
In earlier studies cited, it was evident that utilization
of information of a non-social nature is influenced by both personality
and environmental variables.

These results strongly support the hypo

thesis that utilization of social information

characteristics or

traits of a target person inferred from viewing that person in interac
tion with others

is affected in a similar fashion by both of these

influences.
Since interpersonal evaluation is itself a process of utiliza
tion of available information, it is hardly surprising that differences
in characteristic modes of information utilization produce different
kinds of evaluations.

Individuals high in cognitive complexity,

who have available to them not only a larger number of dimensions,
but also more schemata for organizing various sets of combinatory rules,
were able to produce more complex evaluations than individuals with a
low complexity index.

It may be inferred that, subjectively, the latter
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received less information about the target person, even though ob
jectively the amount of information presented was equivalent for
both groups.

For example, Ss high in cognitive complexity, after

viewing the "friendly" side of the target person, may have developed
a number of dimensions as a basis for judgment, such as "fair-minded";
"friendly"; "good conversationalist."

Ss low in cognitive complexity,

on the other hand, might have placed all of this information in one
dimension, "good."

Thus, when asked to judge the person, the only

evaluation that these Ss could make of him was that he seemed to be
a "good" person.
Scott(1963) has contended that one's level of cognitive com
plexity may be defined as the number of dimensions available to the
individual independent of the basic "good-bad" dimension.

An examina

tion of the evaluations written by Ss in both complexity groups tends
to support this notion, although no quantitative data has been gather
ed.

By and large, Ss in the low complexity group seemed less concerned

with describing the target person in a number of ways than they were
with ascribing to him one major quality

often either "good" or "bad”

and defending that evaluation with examples of his behavior in the
film segments.
The mean number of words used by the Ss in writing their evalu
ations is given in Table 3 for each condition.

The means reveal no

striking pattern, with each group of Ss averaging between 80 and 110
words.

An analysis of variance for these scores, presented in Table 4,
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TABLE 3
MEAN NUMBER OF WORDS USED BY COMPLEXITY LEVEL AND TYPE OF STRESS

NS

RS
r

—

IS
'i

High Complexity

87.0

102.0

83.57

Low Complexity

93.28

86.57

83.85

TABLE 4

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR NUMBER OF WORDS

Source of Variance

df

F
.09

Complexity

1

91.52

Stress

2

397.23

CM

Mean Square

Interaction

2

440.09

.47

Within Groups

36

935.1
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shows no significant differences for either main effects or interactions.
Correlations between all three sets of scores (cognitive com
plexity, number of constructs, number of words) are presented in Table
5.

The only significant correlation obtained is for cognitive com

plexity score and number of constructs; these two sets of scores cor
relate at the .01 level (r = .44, d£ = 40, £<^.01).

The correlations

between words and cognitive complexity and between words and constructs
are negligible.
One problem with using the number of constructs as a measure
of complexity of an evaluation is that it may be contaminated by the
number of words the individual writes.

Obviously, the more words a

subject writes, the greater the probability that he will also use more
constructs.

Thus, differences in verbal fluency may obscure real dif

ferences in cognitive functioning, leading to interpretative difficul
ties.

The data analysis for number of words used, however, indicates

that at least in the present study, verbal fluency had no impact on num
ber of constructs.

Not only did an analysis of variance for words fail

to reveal any significant differences in any combination of conditions,
but, in addition, the correlation between number of words and number of
constructs was only .003.
Figure 1 illustrates some of the relationships implied in the
differences among the cell means for number of constructs.

It is readi

ly apparent that most of the differences in scores across stress levels
were accounted for by the difference between the neutral condition
and the two stress conditions.

An orthogonal analysis of the cell means

(Edwards, 1962) confirms this finding, with a significant(_t = 3.67, df
= 42, p <.Q01) difference between the Ns condition and the RS and IS
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TABLE 5
SUMMARY OF CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY
SCORES, NUMBER OF WORDS AND NUMBER OF CONSTRUCTS

Complexity
and Words

*£ < •01

Complexity
and Constructs

Words and
Constructs

FIGURE 1

MEAN NUMBER OF CONSTRUCTS USED IN EACH CONDI
TION BY STRESS LEVEL AND COMPLEXITY SCORE

21

HIGH COMPLEXITY

MEAN

NUMBER

OF CONSTRUCTS

LOW COMPLEXITY
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conditions combined.
Despite the fact that no significant interaction effects were
found in the analysis of variance for constructs, the influence of stress
seemed to differ for the two complexity levels.

In the HC condition,

there was a proportionally greater decrease in the number of constructs
from no-stress to stress conditions; the difference was much less strik
ing in the LC condition.

An analysis of simple effects(Winer, 1962)

shown in Table 6, supported this interpretation.
cant difference (F = 7.6, df^ = 2/36, jp

There was a signifi

.001) between the stress

conditions for _Ss high in cognitive complexity, while the difference
in the LC condition was minimal (F_ = 1.16, df = 2/36, NS).

86% of the

total variance for the stress conditions and the interaction of stress
and cognitive complexity was accounted for by the differences among
stress levels in the HC condition.
An assessment of the effects of stress reveals primarily that
environmental stress reduces the capacity of the evaluator to cope
with information about the target person, and that the strength of its
influence may depend on the individual’s normal level of cognitive
functioning.

The data clearly indicate a drop in the complexity of the

individual’s evaluation when environmental conditions are altered
from normal to stressful.

Schroder (1965) notes that stress might

act in two ways on cognitive mechanisms: it may reduce the number of
dimensions readily available to the individual for use, or it may weak
en cognitive links between the different dimensions.

The present study

does not offer concrete support for one or the other of these interpre-
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TABLE 6
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR SIMPLE EFFECTS OF STRESS
WITHIN EACH COMPLEXITY LEVEL

Source of Variance

df

Mean Square

F

Stress for High Complexity

2

14.90

7.6*

Stress for Low Complexity

2

2.28

1.16

36

1.96

Within Groups

* £ <.001
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tations, but it does suggest that stress acts to reduce utilization
of information already taken in rather than acting as any kind of "input
filter."

The fact that Ss were exposed to the threat of shock after

viewing the videotapes eliminates the latter interpretation.
Moreover, stress seems to act in a similar manner regardless
of whether or not it is directly linked to the information utilized
in making the evaluation (i.e., whether or not it is perceived as
relevant to the task).

Within each complexity level, the reduction

in the number of constructs used was identical for both task-relevant
and task-irrelevant stress.

Apparently, Ss do not make a distinction

between shock which is going to be administered in another experiment
and shock which is going to be administered as a part of the one they
are engaged in; both are equally threatening.
shock contingent on how well the
him with explicit criteria
er difference.

Perhaps making the

performs his task, and providing

for performance, would have produced a larg

An alternative procedure would entail making the

stress not merely "relevant" to the task, but intrinsic to it.

In

this study, both kinds of stress were induced experimentally; for cer
tain kinds of tasks, the stress is "built into" task performance.
Fear of failure is a primary example of such stress, and in such a case,
it is possible that significant differences would in fact be found
between an "intrinsic stress" condition and a "task-irrelevant" stress
condition.
On the other hand, the inference can be made that stress does
function differently for high and low complexity Ss, with Ss in the *

latter condition showing a smaller impairment in performance than
Ss high in cognitive complexity.

The simplest explanation for

these results is that Ss high in cognitive complexity had "more
to lose" than LC Ss.

The latter are characterized throughout the

literature as individuals possessing only a few informational
dimensions.

It is unlikely, therefore, that stress could have

substantially reduced an already low level of cognitive function
ing.

In contrast, Ss high in cognitive complexity, with a large

number of dimensions, show much larger reductions in ability to
utilize information.

Given this fact, further research might em

ploy only high cognitive complexity _Ss and delineate more precisely
the levels of stress and their influence on the evaluation process.
It is quite possible, for example, that a slight amount of stress
would not impair, or might even enhance evaluative performance.
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